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relating to the need to respond to changing technologies and social circumstances. 13 However, when it comes to constitutional rules, these same scholars suggest that, because of concerns about "fidelity" and also institutional capacity, the literal meaning of the text of the Constitution should almost always be controlling.
14 Yet at the same time, in many cases the literal application of particular constitutional rules has the potential to impose serious error costs. 15 Not only do changes in social circumstances and understandings over time mean that, from a contemporary perspective, a number of core constitutional rules are now no longer optimal. 16 Because such rules often prescribe structures or procedures that affect a variety of substantive legal outcomes, in many cases the error costs involved are also quite significant.
In part because of this, Congress, state legislatures, and even state voters have in several instances sought to design new small "c" constitutional rules aimed at reducing such error costs. In several contexts, such as those involving the Treaty Clause and congressional-executive agreements, the attempt by Congress to pass such "updating legislation" has also enjoyed significant success. However, in other cases, such as Clinton v New York 17 and United States Term Limits Inc. v Thornton, 18 similar attempts at legislative updating have been far less successful. This is in large part because the Supreme Court has held that, no matter how outmoded they be, the mere presence of certain rules in the original Constitution by itself blocks the enactment of such updating legislation.
There is, however, a clear way to address at least part of this problem: in cases where Congress, state legislatures, or even state voters seek in good faith to offset the error costs associated with constitutional rules, the Court should apply an additional margin of deference to determining the constitutional validity of such ac- 13 Balkin, Original Meaning, 24 Const Comm at 301 (cited in note 10).
14 See Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev at 881 (cited in note 12); Balkin, Original Meaning, 24 Const Comm at 305 (cited in note 10). 15 The Constitution's numerical provisions are some of the most extreme instances of rule-like norms, but other examples of potential ongoing significance also include the Emoluments Clause, the clause preventing members of Congress holding any other office (Art I, § 6, cl 2) (including membership in the National Guard), the Natural Born Citizen Clause (Art II, § 1, cl 5), and the Appointments and Removal Clause (Art II, § 2, cl 2). 16 Contrast William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 UC Davis L Rev 2 (1985) . 17 24 US 417 (1998).
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tion-either by way of an additional margin of avoidance, or by way of substantive deference on the merits of a constitutional question, or both.
19
In some cases, where the constitutionality of a measure is clear, such additional deference will simply serve to confirm the validity of the measure. In other cases, where there is little plausible constitutional basis for upholding federal or state action under existing text or precedent, there will also be no capacity to affect the Court's decision, but for the opposite reason: the case for constitutional invalidity was clear. It is thus only in an intermediate category of case, where there is some real doubt or argument as to constitutional validity, that such a plus factor would have the potential to be decisive and therefore lead to a form of "indirect updating" by the Court. Nonetheless, in a number of important cases, such indirect updating would have a clear capacity to help address current constitutional error costs.
Objections to constitutional rule updating by the Court will also have limited force as applied to this kind of indirect, as opposed to direct, form of constitutional rule updating. Arguments about the need for fidelity to the text of the Constitution have almost no force when applied to indirect updating, because the Court under such an approach is acting in full compliance with the literal requirements of the text of the Constitution. Concerns about judicial error also have far less force, because the relevant process of updating involves a process of cooperation between the Court and legislatures, and also tends to be far more reversible than direct forms of updating.
The argument develops in four parts. Part II sets out the error costs associated with core constitutional numerical rules, such as the two Senators rule and two-thirds majority voting requirement in the Treaty Clause. Part III considers the ways in which Congress and state legislatures (and even voters) have arguably attempted to counter such error costs, and the mixed record of success for such attempts at constitutional rule updating by legislatures. It also outlines the core normative proposal offered by the article, according to which the Court would apply an additional margin of deference to attempts by legislatures to update constitutional rules. Part IV considers objections to constitutional rule updating by the Court,
8]
UPDATING CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 323 and shows why such objections have limited applicability to such indirect, as opposed to direct, modes of constitutional rule updating. Part V concludes by considering arguments that the error costs associated with various constitutional rules should instead be addressed by renewed attempts to rely on a process of constitutional amendment, either under Article V or otherwise.
II. Constitutional Rules and Error Costs
In noting the literal interpretation given by the Court to most constitutional rules, constitutional scholars such as David Strauss suggest that one justification for this approach on the part of the Court is that for many constitutional rules, it "is more important that [they] . . . be settled than that they be settled right" or optimally. 20 One potential reason for this is that constitutional rules may address questions the particular answer to which is relatively unimportant to individuals, both subjectively and as a more objective matter, considering the welfare and distributive stakes involved. 21 Strauss likens this situation to a form of pure "coordination game," or cooperative game with multiple equilibria, in which parties are ultimately indifferent between two different strategies, but the payoff to each is much greater if they can "match" that strategy with that of another player.
22
One of the defining features of constitutional rules is also undoubtedly that a number of them do involve a form of pure coordination game. One plausible example of such a provision, which Strauss points to, is Section I of the Twentieth Amendment, which sets 12 noon on January 20 as the time at which the President and Vice-President Elect assume authority under Article II. 23 Almost no one in America seems likely to mind whether the President is inaugurated on January 19 or 20, or at 12 noon or 1 p.m., but most Americans will care a great deal about having agreement on what the relevant date and time are. The opportunities for watching the inauguration, or selling hotel rooms to those who wish to, seem likely to be almost precisely the same whether the inauguration is held on January 19 or 20; whereas if there is uncertainty as to which 324 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2009 date and time apply, there could be a serious constitutional crisis.
24
In such cases, there will also be little capacity from a contemporary perspective for a static or literal reading of constitutional rules to impose error costs, or losses to social welfare (however defined) associated with a suboptimal choice of substantive constitutional norm. 25 However, in many instances, constitutional rules help create coordination against a very different background, where parties do have strong preferences about the substance of particular constitutional norms, or at least about the results they produce. In such cases, the form of constitutional coordination involved is far closer to a "battle of the sexes" than a pure coordination game, 26 where parties prefer coordination to noncoordination, but each also prefers a different basis for coordination. 27 (Think of a married couple who wish to spend the evening together, one of whom wishes to go the opera, the other to a wrestling match.) There will thus also be far greater potential for the particular choice of constitutional rules made by the Framers to involve error costs, when judged from a contemporary perspective.
Take two core constitutional numerical rules: the two Senators rule and the requirement in the Treaty Clause that treaties be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. The application of each rule has in recent years had major economic and social consequences, and has created clear "winners" and "losers" on issues which are in fact highly charged "as a matter of morality or public policy." 28 In recent years, political scientists have shown that there is a consistent bias in federal spending toward small as opposed to large states. 29 They have also shown that this disparity is almost impos- 24 Id. sible to explain other than by reference to the power of Senators in small states to advance special legislation favoring their state, or legislation, the benefits of which are expected to exceed the costs for citizens in that state, but not the nation as a whole. 30 The two Senators rule also plays a critical role in this because, while the Senate is checked by the House in its capacity to pass such special interest legislation, there is still a clear, statistically significant overall correlation between a state's voting power in Congress and the share it receives of federal government spending. 31 In the context of the Treaty Clause, the requirements it imposes for successful ratification of a treaty also have major implications for the likelihood that the United States will ratify treaties of major public policy significance. Take two major treaties rejected by the Senate over the last decade: the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT) and the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-CLOS). 32 The ratification of the CNTBT was rejected by a narrow majority of the Senate in 1999 (48 votes for, and 51 against, ratification), but many commentators suggest that under an ordinary majority rule, it would in fact have prevailed, owing to the potential for increased lobbying efforts by the President. 33 The Law of the Sea Convention, in turn, gained clear supermajority support in the Senate (49 yea votes as opposed to 30 nays), but failed just short of the two-thirds supermajority support required for successful ratification. The failure by the Senate to ratify each treaty has also clearly had major military and economic consequences.
The failure to ratify the CNTBT has, from a military perspective, 30 Id at 41-42. It cannot, for example, be explained by any principled concern to redistribute resources from rich to poor states. Another potentially important distributive consequence of the two Senators rule is that it tends to reduce at least the "descriptive" or visible representation of minority voters in 34 In a domestic context, it has also strengthened the argument for alternatives to the CNTBT regime, such as proposals for a national missile defense system, that themselves have cost billions of dollars and altered the terms of the general foreign policy debate. 35 Economically, failure to ratify the CNTBT has implied the failure to reap the full benefits of past expenditures in anticipation of the CNTBT's taking effect, such as the United States' contribution to a $1 billion International Monitoring System designed to enforce the CNTBT, and hundreds of millions of dollars of domestic expenditure on a "Stockpile Stewardship" program designed to maintain the safety and integrity of the United States' nuclear arsenal without the use of nuclear testing.
36
As to the Law of the Sea Convention, the failure to ratify the treaty has been defended as protecting U.S. sovereignty and specifically the integrity of U.S. military operations under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which authorizes the U.S. military to interdict vessels engaged in the traffic of weapons of mass destruction. 37 Supporters of the Convention, on the other hand, suggest that the United States' failure to ratify the Convention has undermined, rather than helped, promote the effectiveness of the PSI, and also put the United States in a position of strategic weakness in relation to the use of key maritime passages such as in Indonesia where, without a treaty, it must depend on bilateral consent for use of such passages. 38 The economic stakes behind the 34 Editorial, The Test Ban Treaty, NY Times at A18 (cited in note 32). 
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Convention are also high: they include not only the costs associated with the increased risk of environmental damage to the Arctic without the treaty, but also how major new oil reserves in the Arctic are divided among nations such as Russia, Denmark, Canada, and the United States, in relation to which the longer the United States delays ratifying the treaty, the less likely it is to be able successfully to claim such reserves without serious opposition from these other nations.
39
Whatever their ultimate view of the two treaties, most commentators therefore agree that, by leading to the defeat of these treaties as part of U.S. law, the Treaty Clause has not only had some distributional consequences, but has also decided issues of significant national importance. In both contexts, demographic changes have also been sufficiently great since 1789 that, from a contemporary perspective, the two Senators rule and Treaty Clause now almost certainly impose literal requirements that are either over-or underinclusive.
In the context of the two Senators rule, increases in population have occurred at substantially higher rates in large as compared to small states. (In 1790, for example, the three smallest states in the union, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Georgia, contained 6 percent of the national population, 40 whereas in 2000, the three smallest states, Wyoming, Vermont, and Alaska, were home to a mere 0.6 percent of voters.
41
) This has meant that voters in small states now have a vastly more disproportionate say in national legislation decision making compared to voters in large states, even when compared to 1790. 42 In the Treaty Clause context, the admission of new states and the increase this has caused in the overall size of the Senate since 1789 has also been such that, even if one assumes that the clause was optimal when it was adopted, from a contemporary 39 One estimate is that, under the treaty, the United States would stand to claim an additional 500,000 square kilometers north of the Arctic Circle as a potential additional oil reserve: 
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perspective, it almost certainly imposes error costs in the direction of under-ratification of treaties. The size of a voting body will have the potential to influence the effective difficulty of obtaining a supermajority in that body for two interrelated reasons: one having to do with the increase in decision costs associated with larger decision-making bodies, and the other with the statistical likelihood that a supermajority of at least quasiindependent decision makers will favor a particular proposal. 43 Decision costs alone can take at least two forms: those opportunity costs implicit in the time taken to debate and vote on a particular proposal, and those costs associated with the potential for "holdup" or a veto by some members of a collective decision-making body. 44 Both forms of decision cost will also tend to increase consistently with any increase in the size of a representative decisionmaking body, such as the Senate. 45 As I have shown elsewhere with Richard Holden, the law of large numbers is another reason why, in larger voting bodies, it may be harder to obtain the supermajority of votes necessary for a particular proposal, such as a proposal that a particular treaty be ratified. 46 Under a supermajority voting rule, the law of large numbers means that, even absent any change in decision costs, in a large decisionmaking body it is far less likely than in a smaller body that there will be an idiosyncratic draw of preferences or types in favor of such a proposal. This can be demonstrated by a simple example involving a series of coin tosses in which "heads" is treated as a vote in favor of ratifying a treaty, and "tails" as a vote against ratification. For a voting body with (say) three or six members, the probability of successful ratification is 50 percent or 34 percent, respectively, whereas for a voting body of even 12 or 24, the probability is as low as 19 percent or 8 percent. For a voting body with 100 members, 43 the probability of successful ratification falls below 1 percent. 47 If one makes certain stylized assumptions about voting patterns on the ratification of treaties (i.e., that (1) the median U.S. voter is more or less indifferent about whether or not to ratify international treaties in the abstract, (2) the views of the median voter in this context have remained more or less constant over time, and (3) the views of particular members of the Senate on questions of treaty ratification are drawn at least semirandomly from the voting population as a whole, relative to that of the median voter) one can in fact quantify quite concretely the increase this implies over time in the effective difficulty of treaty ratification under the Treaty Clause. Figure 1 , for example, sets out one calculation of the functional equivalent to the original trade-off made by the Framers between what one might call "flexibility" and "rigidity" costs when it came to adopting the requirement of two-thirds majority support for the ratification of treaties for progressive changes in the size of the Senate. (The dotted line shows the "adjusted" supermajority rule for each change in the size of the Senate, which would maintain the original functional trade-off made by the Framers between rel-47 This effect is also quite general and does not depend on the binary nature of outcomes in the "coin flip" setting. It applies even where there is a continuum of voter preferences and policy choices: see Richard Holden, Supermajority Rules (Working Paper, 2009), available online at: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/Richard.holden/papers/index.html.
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[2009 evant competing costs, and its shape reflects not only the gradual "deflation" in the adjusted supermajority rule but also the tie-breaking, or integer-rounding, problem created by there being an even number of Senators at all times. The solid line shows the (thirdorder polynomial) trend line in the adjusted supermajority rule over time.) The potential error costs these calculations imply from a contemporary perspective are also evident when one considers that several important treaties rejected by the Senate-including UN-CLOS-would almost certainly have passed under such an adjusted supermajority threshold.
48

III. Constitutional Rule Updating-by Legislatures
In the face of these error costs, the Supreme Court has (for good reason, Part IV suggests) taken almost no steps actively to update various constitutional rules. However, Congress, state legislatures, and indeed even voters have consistently attempted to do so-and in several cases, enjoyed significant success in the passage of such updating legislation. The most prominent example of successful legislative rule updating of this kind in fact involves the Treaty Clause itself and the development by Congress of "congressional-executive agreements" as an alternative pathway to international lawmaking under Article I.
As the effective difficulty of ratifying treaties under the Treaty Clause has increased over the last two centuries in the way figure 1 identifies, so too has the use of executive agreements steadily increased. From the 1890s onward, there has also been a particularly distinct shift in the use of such agreements relative to the treaty form in that, since that time, the United States has not only come to rely more heavily on executive agreements than on treaties; 49 Between 1803 and 1838, the ratio of treaties to executive agreements signed by the United States was roughly 2:1 (60 treaties and 27 executive agreements), and between 1840 and 1888 1:1 (215 treaties and 238 executive agreements), whereas thereafter it was at least 1:2. Whether coincidental or not, this shift has also occurred in close parallel to changes in the relationship between the actual supermajority requirements of the Treaty Clause and the adjusted supermajority rule set out in figure 1, given that in the 1890s, the gap between these two requirements was at its greatest.
51
At least one way in which to understand the increasing use of congressional-executive agreements, as opposed to treaties, over the last century is, therefore, as a response by Congress to the increasing error costs associated with the literal requirements of the Treaty Clause.
52 It is also now well settled that the use by Congress and the President of such congressional-executive agreements is consistent with both Articles I and II of the Constitution, so that there is little doubt that, if this is the case, Congress has in fact succeeded in using ordinary legislative means to update constitutional meaning (i.e., the supermajority voting rule found in Article II). 51 Of course, the use of such congressional executive agreements also greatly increased from the 1930s and 1940s onward, both in the trade context and also much more broadly. This has led some commentators to argue that the overall shift in international lawmaking processes, from treaties to congressional-executive agreements, in fact constitutes a distinct informal Constitutional amendment to the Treaty Clause, which occurred around 1944-45. See Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev at 873-900 (cited in note 50).
52 But see id at 873-900 (advancing an entirely different theory of why congressionalexecutive agreements have been recognized as valid in the latter part of the twentieth century, based on a theory of informal Constitutional amendment). 53 For the general acceptance of the interchangeability of treaties and congressionalexecutive agreements, see, e.g., Hathaway, 117 Yale L J at 1239 (cited in note 50); Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev at 806-08 (cited in note 50).
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of the error costs, from a contemporary perspective, of a core Constitutional rule, namely, the enactment of a presidential line-item veto as a means of mitigating the effect of a two Senators rule. A presidential line-item veto clearly does not have an unlimited capacity to reduce disparities in federal spending between small and large states 54 because it is likely to be used by the President for these purposes only in those small states that are not competitive in presidential elections, and even then most likely only in a subset of those states that vote against the incumbent President. 55 However, at least in this subset of cases it does have the potential to reduce the fiscal distortion caused by such a rule. Its actual tendency to do so may also be far from trivial, considering that, on this basis, every Democratic President since 1960, bar one, could potentially have vetoed spending measures in Alaska, Idaho, North and South Dakota, and Wyoming-or five of the twelve smallest states; and every Republican President since Nixon could have vetoed measures in Hawaii and for the most part also Rhode Island. 56 At the same time, for some Justices at least, there is a real question whether, as a form of purely legislative rule, a line-item veto is consistent with other constitutional provisions, such as those in Article I, Section 7 governing the exercise of a presidential veto. In Clinton v New York, 57 a majority of the Court also ultimately rejected the validity of the line-item veto as inconsistent with the procedures in Article I, Section 7. In writing for the Court, Justice Stevens held that there were "important differences between the President's 'return' of a bill pursuant to Article I § 7, and the exercise of the President's cancellation authority pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act," including in the timing and comprehensiveness of the relevant power. 58 Stevens noted further that, although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President's action in the former case, 54 For doubts about the effectiveness of a line-item veto, though mostly as a means of reducing overall spending, rather than malapportioned spending, see, e.g., Baker and Dinkin, 13 J L & Pol at 34 (cited in note 29). 55 Exercising the veto in a small state that has voted for the President's party, while not directly harming the President's reelection chances, could still significantly harm the reelection chances of congressional representatives from the President's party. 56 Only Presidents Reagan and Nixon, in their second Terms, would not confidently have used such a veto, given their overwhelming national reelection returns which put Rhode Island in the Republican column. The exception to the Democratic pattern was President Johnson, because of his overwhelming victory nationally. 57 524 US 417 (1998). 58 Id at 438-39.
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it is silent in the latter; and given both this history and ordinary principles of constitutional construction, there were "powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence as equivalent to an express prohibition." 59 An even starker example of where attempts of this kind at legislative updating have failed involves the Qualifications Clauses, and the arguable attempt by state voters to offset the increasing length of congressional tenure allowed by the "deflation" of the age floors in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2. While it certainly seems plausible to think that these age requirements were in part designed to ensure a certain level of maturity or experience on the part of candidates for office, another presupposition of the Framers may have been that they would serve to limit the total number of years that representative served, on average. 60 In the early Republic there was, for example, a strong norm of voluntary retirement or "rotation in office." Life expectancies, even if somewhat higher for elected officials than the population at large, were also radically lower than now. (For example, in 1789 one calculation suggests that, conditional on living to age 30, average life expectancy was 60-or 30 years beyond the time at which one could first be elected; whereas in 2004, the National Vital Statistic Report shows that, conditional on reaching the ages of 25 or 30, relevant to Qualifications Clauses in Article I, average life expectancy was 79-80-or 54 to 49 years beyond the time of first possible election.) The combined result was that in the decades after the Constitution was first enacted, average congressional tenure was 2-3 years, whereas now it is more than 10 years in the House and 12 years in the Senate.
On this reading, the literal requirements of the Qualifications Clauses have also, progressively, become too low to serve the purposes for which they were enacted. On the Supreme Court's interpretation of them, they have also directly blocked the possibility of renewal by Congress, state legislatures, and state voters of the relevant eligibility floor.
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In United States v Thornton, 61 in considering a state law imposing term limits on members of Congress, the Court held that the literal requirements of the Qualifications Clauses not only "fix" the eligibility requirements for Congress vis-à-vis candidates' age. It also held that, according to the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the specific excludes the general), which was known to the Framers, 62 these requirements exhaust the full range of qualifications that may legitimately be imposed on members of Congress so that neither the states nor Congress could seek to increase rotation in electoral office by adding to or "supplementing" those qualifications.
63
The Court applied a similar analysis in Clinton v New York, in the context of line-item veto legislation. In the treaty context itself, Professor Larry Tribe has also made cogent arguments, to similar effect, against recognizing broad scope for Congress under Article I to pass congressional-executive agreements-thereby bypassing Article II, Clause 2. 64 For legislative attempts to update constitutional rules to succeed consistently, therefore, what is needed, I argue, is for the Court to afford some additional margin of deference to such legislation-at least equal in force to this expressio unius presumption.
In cases where the constitutionality of a measure is clear, such deference may simply serve to confirm the validity of that measure. In other cases, where there is little plausible constitutional basis for upholding federal or state action, under existing text or precedent, such a plus factor will also have no capacity to affect the Court's decision, but for the opposite reason: that the case for constitutional invalidity is clear (think, here, of Article I congressional-executive agreements before 1937). Only in an intermediate category of case, where there is some real doubt or argument as to constitutional validity, will the constitutional "plus" provided by such a principle potentially be decisive, and even then it must be weighed with other 61 514 US 779 (1995) . 62 Id at 779, 792 n 9. The Court also placed significant reliance on broader historical arguments, considered in 67 and also substantive deference on the merits, when determining the scope of Congress's authority under Article I to enact such agreements.
68
A further example of the Justices adopting such an approach is also found in the dissenting judgment of Justice Breyer in Clinton v New York upholding the constitutionality of a Presidential lineitem veto. Not only, for example, did Justice Breyer in this context reject arguments based on the formal gap between the literal requirements of Article I, Section 7 and the line item, on the basis that where "the question is one of literal violation of the law," the 65 See, e.g., Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 555 (2005) (Kennedy, J) (suggesting that international practice served merely to "confirm" the Court's finding that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional); Roper v Simmons, 543 US at 587 (O'Connor, J, dissenting) (suggesting that domestic norms were such that no international consensus could tip the balance toward invalidity); Knight v Florida 528 US 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J, dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (suggesting that international consensus was sufficient to tip the balance in favor of a grant of certiorari). In this sense, the deference due to legislative attempts to update constitutional rules under such an approach will closely resemble the weight given by the Court in recent cases to evidence of a foreign or international legal consensus in a particular constitutional area. 66 Compare Dixon, Working Paper 2010 (cited in note 4). In some cases, of course, there is also a further question as to how significant Court judgments themselves are to ultimate constitutional outcomes. See, e.g., debates over the significance of constitutional judgments such as INS v Chadha concerning legislative vetoes: see Adam Samaha, Low Stakes (paper prepared for the symposium: The Judiciary and the Popular Will, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, 2010) (on file with author). 67 In a context such as the Treaty Clause, involving core separation of powers issues, Constitutional avoidance by courts is particularly valuable because it allows Congress and the President to adopt new practices that can themselves act as a "gloss" on the meaning of the text of the Constitution: 
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Court should not seek to parse compliance as a matter of degree; 69 he also held that even though the relevant veto power "skirt[ed] a constitutional edge" when it came to (more functional) separation of powers and nondelegation principles, it should be afforded an additional margin of deference as "an experiment that may, or may not, help representative government work better," 70 thereby implicitly connecting such deference to the desirability of offsetting some of the disparities in federal spending caused by the two Senators rule. 71 Moreover, no Justice was willing to uphold the relevant legislation without also endorsing at least some of Justice Breyer's reasoning in this context.
72
In the future, the likelihood that many cases involving attempts at legislative rule updating will be "hard" or otherwise evenly balanced also means that, even if some members of the Court are willing to endorse such a principle, this could significantly increase the chances that such rules will successfully survive a judicial challenge. 73 In many of these cases, the importance of the issues involved-such as, for example, in the context of the two Senators rule-will also only add to the overall significance of any such result.
IV. Objections to Updated Constitutional Rules: Direct versus Indirect Updating
Defenders of the constitutional status quo (in which the Court adopts an evolutionary approach to constitutional standards 69 524 US 417, 473 (Breyer, J, dissenting). 70 Id at 498. 71 Id at 468-73 (workable government), 498 (representative government). 72 See id at 497 (O'Connor and Scalia, JJ, dissenting (and concurring in part III of Breyer's reasoning rejecting automatic application of an expressio unius principle)). 73 Two areas in which such a principle might possibly apply, in addition to those already mentioned, are, for example, attempts by Congress to reduce the racially disparate impact of the two Senators rule or to reduce the resource implications, for the federal courts, of the Twenty Dollars Clause. 
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but not rules) make two broad arguments against more direct forms of constitutional rule updating by the Court: one based on a concern about fidelity by the Justices to the text of the Constitution and the costs of disrupting settled expectations about the meaning of constitutional rules, 74 and a second based on a concern about institutional competence and the capacity for judicial error costs in the process of updating. 75 The first argument is the simplest and most absolute, and turns on the idea that where the text is relatively "rule-like, concrete and specific," notions of interpretive fidelity on the part of the Justices mean that the text necessarily controls constitutional meaning. 76 A related argument is that if the Court departs from such specific textual provisions in one case, especially those with high public salience, it "greatly increase[s] the risk that the [current] valuable consensus on the text will dissolve generally, increasing the potential for disruption and for outcomes that are, even to those who dislike [the substance of the rule], worse still." 77 The costs associated with disruption of this kind will also tend, so the argument goes, to be even greater for constitutional rules than standards, because a key function of constitutional rules is to settle constitutional conflict, or to provide a "focal point" for various forms of socially valuable coordination. 78 The second argument is also straightforward. It turns on the idea that in many areas involving constitutional rules, the subject matter of those rules is such that the Court lacks relevant expertise and information and therefore may misjudge the capacity of the particular rule to advance given objectives, or impose other unintended 338 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2009 costs. 79 Related to this will also be the degree to which, if the Court does err in a particular context in being willing to engage in a form of constitutional rule updating, such error costs are likely to be practically reversible by Congress or state legislatures via ordinary legislative means.
In many, if not all, situations these arguments together also provide a powerful case against the desirability of direct updating of constitutional rules by the Court. 80 However, the force of these arguments simply does not hold when applied to indirect as opposed to direct modes of constitutional rule updating by the Court.
A decision by the Court to apply additional deference to particular legislation, under an indirect updating approach, in no way involves a decision to disregard the text of the Constitution, literally construed. In fact, because it depends for its operation on consideration of the full range of other constitutional sources that provide support for the validity of particular legislative action, it encourages careful attention by the Court to the entire text of the Constitution. Unlike more direct forms of updating, such an approach therefore raises neither any real concern about fidelity in particular cases nor, on slippery-slope grounds, about fidelity to the constitutional text as a whole.
With respect to fears about judicial error costs, such concerns will be vastly less applicable to indirect as opposed to direct approaches to constitutional rule updating. The fact that Congress or state legislatures have primary responsibility under such an approach for designing replacement constitutional rules means that, simply by virtue of the law of large numbers, there is a greater chance that the relevant rules will be well designed from the outset.
81
In some cases, at least, Congress will also have important advantages over the Court in terms of both internal diversity and access to relevant information. 82 For constitutional procedural rules such as the Treaty Clause that touch directly on processes internal to Con- 79 On the idea of error costs in the process of Constitutional decision making by the Court, see, e.g., Cass R. 
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gress, access to such information will also be particularly valuable.
83
Even if the Court does in fact err in the process of constitutional rule updating, under an indirect as opposed to direct approach, there will be the added safeguard of a much greater chance of Congress or the states being able to reverse such errors-by ordinary legislative means.
Take a potential decision by the Court to read the word "two" in Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 in a functional way so as to give California, New York, and Texas twelve Senators, Wyoming two Senators, and most other states some number in between (a twelve Senators rule), and thereby preserve the underlying ratio of large to small state representation on which the two Senators rule was based, 84 and compare this to (say) the line-item veto as a more indirect response by Congress to the error costs associated with the two Senators rule.
Assuming a twelve Senators rule were actually implemented, such a decision by the Court would be very difficult to reverse. 85 The main reason for this is that, if the Senate were enlarged so as to give greater representation to large states, Senators who thereby gained office would likely tend to oppose further rounds of reapportionment aimed at reducing the size of the Senate. For such Senators to support such measures would almost certainly mean putting their own office at risk, and broader studies of congressional voting patterns suggest that this means later reapportionment is, at best, unlikely.
86 Another obstacle to reversing such a decision would 83 Evidence of this is arguably the decision by Congress to exempt trade-related international agreements, but not most other agreements, from the operation of the filibuster: see, e.g., Hathaway, 117 Yale L J at 1261 (cited in note 50). Striking in this context is also the parallel between changes in the requirements for a motion for cloture under Senate Rule 22, and the adjusted supermajority rule set out in figure 1: In the context of line-item veto, by contrast, if Congress at any time came to the view that the line-item veto was not serving its purpose, it could simply undo the error made by the Court in upholding it by repealing the relevant statute that authorized it. The same position would apply in the treaty context if the Senate came to the view that, as a means of international lawmaking, congressional-executive agreements were being overused relative to the treaty form. In key areas of national significance such as those involving human rights or multinational security cooperation, even a minority of Senators could reassert their prior privileges under the Treaty Clause by use of the filibuster. 88 In other contexts, if they were able to gain a majority in favor of their view, Senators could also reassert the need to give broader scope to the Treaty Clause simply by blocking passage of various congressional-executive agreements. At the level of fidelity, judicial error, and the reversibility of any such errors, there is, therefore, a crucial difference between indirect and more direct modes of updating when it comes to objections to the idea of constitutional rule updating by the Court.
V. Amending versus Updating
For some, any form of constitutional updating by the Court will nonetheless be ruled out by the fact that Article V, or least equivalent processes of constitutional amendment, are understood to provide the exclusive mode of legitimate constitutional updating. 89 In some countries, where the requirements for successful constitutional amendment are less demanding than in the United States, that recently elected members of the House are far more likely to support congressional term-limit proposals than longer-serving members). 87 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard, 1965) . 88 See Hathaway, 117 Yale L J at 1304-05 (cited in note 50).
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For both the two Senators rule and the Treaty Clause, political realities further mean that, even if these formal legal hurdles to amendment did not exist, it would still be extremely difficult to rely on Article V in order to amend these rules. As Baker and Dinkin argue in the context of Article I, Section 3, Clause 1, "any state that currently receives disproportionately great representation in the Senate relative to its share of the nation's population benefits from the existing allocation of representation and therefore should have little interest in changing it," and "the number of such overrepresented states has always exceeded the one-third-plus-one necessary to block the mere proposal of any constitutional amendment." 100 Accordingly, it also follows that Senators from small states will be extremely unlikely to support any amendment which might make it easier to amend Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 and especially one as broad as an amendment to Article V itself.
101
This same argument holds for use of Article V to amend the Treaty Clause. Why, one might ask, would two-thirds of Senators, other than in the most exceptional cases, vote to remove the right of two-thirds of Senators to decide whether or not to ratify a treaty? As Edwin Corwin suggested in 1940 in criticizing the Treaty Clause, there seems not "the least likelihood that . . . two thirds of the Senate [will] consent to relax that body's powers" especially in an area of such potential significance. 102 I have shown elsewhere that because it contains the same two-thirds supermajority requirement for congressional approval as the Treaty Clause, Article V is itself one of the most prominent examples of a constitutional rule that, from a contemporary perspective, likely involves error costs. 103 For either the two Senators rule or the Treaty Clause to be successfully amended, the only realistic route for proponents of such change will therefore be informal amendment to the Constitution, other than via Article V, where these problems of endogeneity may be less severe.
Bruce Ackerman, in developing what it is perhaps the leading account of informal amendment in the United States, identifies two Other proposals designed to overcome the difficulty of formal constitutional amendment under Article V also encounter difficulties when applied to many constitutional rules. One proposal, by Akhil Amar, is that Americans should be free to amend the Constitution via a national referendum process. 110 Whatever its general merits, the difficulty with this proposal as applied to most constitutional rules is that it assumes a degree of popular interest in proposed amendment that simply will not exist in the case of many specific, technical constitutional provisions, such as the Treaty Clause or even the two Senators rule.
111
A second proposal I have developed elsewhere is that the Court should give some degree of positive force to proposed and failed, as well as successful, constitutional amendments, according to the degree of support they receive in Congress and state legislatures.
112
By enlisting Congress, rather than voters, as the initiator of constitutional change under Article V, my approach is also clearly less sensitive than Amar's to the need for popular interest in the error costs associated with specific constitutional rules. By adjusting the level of deference enjoyed by congressional or state legislation to the degree of support a proposed amendment enjoys in Congress and state legislatures, my proposal also encounters some of this same difficulty, albeit in less acute form.
No matter how one conceives of applying or redesigning the constitutional amendment process, therefore, it is almost inevitable that an insistence on reliance on such processes as a means of constitutional updating will be simply to endorse, rather than address, the current deficit regarding the updating of constitutional rules. If one takes seriously, as many proponents of amendment exclusivity do, this deficit and its effects in areas such as federal spending, 
